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Abstract 
Wireless ad hoc high performance clusters extend the paradigm of contemporary wired cluster architectures to present the great 
possibility of achieving ubiquitous distributed computing in the near future. The explosion of mobile devices such as smart 
phones, tablets, laptops and wearable tech that are nearing workstation grade performance benchmarks make the concept of 
wireless clusters a reality. However, the physical characteristics of the wireless medium and distributed nature of computing 
gives rise to many targeted security vulnerabilities that need to be properly identified and addressed. This paper presents a survey 
on security issues, threats, challenges and contingency measures that are suitable to reduce the risk of occurrence and impact 
should such threats materialize. Security issues that impact battery life of nodes, performance of the cluster and data integrity are 
analyzed carefully, culminating in a general policy and architecture proposal for establishing node trust in wireless clusters. 
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
Peer-review under responsibility of the organizing committee of RAEREST 2016. 
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1. Introduction 
High performance clusters have been traditionally associated with specialized set-ups and wired connectivity. It is 
a cost effective solution to supercomputing and provides higher scalability in comparison, thus providing a backbone 
architecture for performing computation rich tasks such as big data processing and management as well as complex 
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algorithm runs. The exponential growth and adoption of wireless communication media over the last decade has 
given rise to new opportunities for the widespread use of distributed computing as commodity technology. The 
formation of wireless ad hoc high performance clusters is possible due to the burgeoning number of powerful mobile 
devices with the capability to act as cluster nodes, which can ultimately lead to an omnipresent collaborative 
computing environment. Applications that can benefit from wireless clusters include interaction between smart 
devices to produce changes in the environment, general or specific collaborative computing and intelligent sensor 
networks collecting and processing vast amounts of stream data [1]. 
Ad hoc networks are by definition set up in spontaneous conditions without the need for an existing network 
infrastructure. This extends connectivity to previously unreachable locations and makes feasible several new 
applications. However, ad hoc networks are vulnerable to some well-known threats that are intrinsic to the 
communication medium and that arise due to the dearth of supporting infrastructure [2]. Specific attacks such as 
eavesdropping and active wiretapping that are difficult to carry out in wired networks are far easier to carry out in 
wireless networks [3]. Thus, securing wireless ad hoc networks is a challenge in itself. Moreover, there are 
performance and battery life constraints that determine the security controls established to mitigate security issues.  
This paper presents serious attacks that can exploit flaws and loopholes to compromise the functioning of wireless 
ad hoc high performance clusters. The fundamental motivation for the construction of a cluster is to obtain a 
significant gain in computing performance, one that can be severely hampered by security risks. A high performance 
cluster is mission critical, implying that the correctness and consistency of data accumulated, transferred and 
processed within the cluster is paramount. In the following sections, major security vulnerabilities and challenges in 
the development of wireless clusters are discussed. 
2. Security vulnerabilities and challenges  
2.1. Impersonation of an authorized cluster node 
Impersonation is more probable in wide area networks than in local networks. However, the goal of achieving 
pervasive computing means local wireless clusters should be able to interact together to form inter-domain grids, 
thus increasing the likelihood of impersonation attacks. Impersonation with respect to high performance clusters 
involves an attacker that tries to add a possibly fraudulent node to the network by utilizing the authentication and 
uniquely identifying details of an already authorized cluster node. Various ways in which impersonation attacks are 
carried out include device cloning, address spoofing, exploiting rogue base stations and masquerading.  
Device cloning [4], of which address spoofing is a part, is the reprogramming of a foreign node in order to 
emulate hardware characteristics such as MAC address of another device already authorized to be a part of the 
network. Cluster monitors [5] as a result cannot distinguish any suspicious behavior and entrust the foreign node that 
is now illegitimately part of the network. Thus the integrity of the network is compromised and can lead to serious 
ramifications. A cluster monitor may assign jobs to a malicious cluster neighbor and as a result disclose the nature of 
the job and data being processed by the cluster. Of even greater consequence is if the task execution results are 
falsified, resulting in cascading errors causing the improper execution of the assigned job.  
Impersonation is difficult to detect due to the automated nature of verification of identity. A mechanism to 
eliminate the possibility of impersonation would require the use of an authentication mechanism that uses some 
unforgeable, non-transferrable ID. Hence, an application layer authentication scheme must be introduced on top of 
the basic network level authentication. 
2.2. Single system image level cluster authentication    
Cluster nodes must be properly authenticated to ensure required confidentiality and integrity of jobs that are 
processed. A highly effective authentication mechanism should foil impersonation attempts actively. However, due 
to the lack of infrastructure in ad hoc networks, dedicated authentication hardware such as VASCO DIGIPASS [6] 
is not an option. However, software based strong two-factor authentication schemes for authentication provide a 
viable alternative. The cluster master node would be responsible for allowing initial registration of a cluster node 
with the wireless ad hoc cluster. Successive accesses and connections would require a uniquely generated numeric 
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PIN at the requesting node that is sent to the master node for verification [7]. The same numeric PIN is generated 
both at the requesting node and master node in an asynchronous manner, thus disallowing the interception or 
counterfeit fabrication of the PIN by rogue agents. The trustworthiness and security of the cluster network would be 
dramatically improved. Thus, any cluster node would have to pass through the underlying wireless network 
authentication mechanisms as well as the application layer cluster authentication.   
This layer of additional authentication places an additional burden on the master node with a tradeoff on the 
battery life of the master node. The master node would need to meet certain minimum specifications for the wireless 
ad hoc cluster to function optimally. 
2.3. Black hole attack 
A black hole attack is a security threat in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET). It is a denial of service attack 
whereby a threat agent manages to register a malicious node (acting as a black hole) in the network and 
masquerades itself to present itself as a reliable node in the network. Such nodes will simply discard all packets that 
are routed via the node to other destinations instead of relaying it to the appropriate neighboring node. When a node 
needs to communicate with some other node in the network, the sender would attempt to find the shortest path to the 
destination according to routing information received by broadcast messages. A malicious node would advertise 
itself by broadcasting as being the optimal path with the shortest number of hops to send the packets through [8]. 
The sender unwittingly acknowledges the reply from the malicious node, thus, sending all packets to it. The 
malicious node receives incoming packets, drops them and sends back falsified messages of successful delivery.  
This attack is a very certain possibility in wireless ad hoc high performance clusters and can cause the entire 
cluster processing to cease. Any node in the cluster may be transformed into a black hole with severe consequences. 
A cluster monitor which accepts jobs and sub-jobs from the cluster master node splits and assigns these jobs to 
neighboring cluster nodes that fall under its jurisdiction. If a cluster monitor goes rogue, it would accept jobs from 
the master node and would do nothing instead of further subdividing them into tasks for assignment to other nodes. 
One step further, the cluster monitor could then misrepresent node activity and load statistics, causing resource 
deadlocks and wastage of available resources in the network. An ordinary cluster node turned malicious would have 
a similar impact although the extent of the damage may vary, as shown in Fig 1. 
 
Fig. 1. (a) Cluster monitor as black hole; (b) General cluster node as black hole 
Black hole attacks and the perpetrating nodes are hard to detect. It would require the monitoring of the activities 
of each node and flagging unusual suspicious behavior [9], which is not feasible in wireless cluster applications due 
to the performance hit that is inevitable as a result of implementing the mechanism. A conceivable way to reduce the 
effect of a black hole attack would be to route the packets through different alternate paths to increase the 
probability of the packets reaching their intended destination [10].  Duplication of effort in the processing of jobs to 
(a) (b) 
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eliminate the risk of loss of data in the cluster would be an extreme measure that would reduce the availability of 
computing resources in the cluster. 
2.4. Wormhole attack 
A wormhole attack is initiated by a threat agent when the routing table of a node in the network is compromised. 
This compromised node surveys the network, populating the routing table with the worst possible paths to send the 
incoming packets through [11]. The node presents itself as being the quickest hop to all possible destination nodes, 
acting as wormhole portal for quick transmission, although the tunnels are actually relatively much longer and 
inefficient paths. Thus other nodes in the network are fooled into transmitting packets via this node.  
Although the wormhole attack seldom incapacitates the functioning of the network, it has negative effects on the 
performance of the network. In wireless ad hoc cluster applications, this would degrade the throughput of the entire 
cluster due to the increase in latency and transmission delays in the receipt of packets. Since all the packets pass 
through the wormhole, the attacker can capture, view and modify passing data. Mission critical applications like 
clusters need to enforce required confidentiality and integrity, the lack of which is a considerable security threat. An 
attacker could identify each job and its parameters that have been submitted to the cluster for execution. 
Modification to job parameters would result in incorrect outputs. Furthermore wormholes can encourage job 
starvation and delayed processing at destination nodes by bouncing incoming data packets. The effects of a 
wormhole could possibly be alleviated in a manner similar to black holes as well as using packet leashes [12] to 
restrict the maximum allowed distance over which a packet may be transmitted. 
2.5. Forced malicious connection drops 
Ad hoc networks are very vulnerable to connectivity issues due to the nature of the transmission medium and the 
frequent changes in topology due to the potential mobile nature of nodes. Moreover ad hoc networks lack 
infrastructure that would otherwise be available in wired and dedicated wireless installations. Thus, connectivity 
management is a crucial task. An attacker may hamper connectivity by targeting the connectivity infrastructure such 
as access points if any or may target networked nodes directly. Since clusters assign sub tasks to different nodes, it is 
possible that nodes may temporarily disconnect from the network. This is not immediately assumed to be a node 
failure as the node may rejoin the network and return the output of the assigned task. However, the maximum 
waiting time is predefined for a node to rejoin and continue its previously assigned task. Exceeding the time limit 
would result in the task being re-allotted to another cluster node. This time limit can be exploited as a point of 
weakness whereby network access points or nodes are disconnected for a time exceeding the maximum waiting time 
limit for reconnection. If this is done for every job that is received at the node, the cluster performance would 
degrade super-linearly. The completed job at a disconnected node may be either kept or discarded, as once the job is 
reassigned the delayed results from disconnection are deemed void. An access point based ad hoc infrastructure may 
act as single point of failures for all the nodes in their vicinity in the above scenario and the cluster would be unable 
to provide any productive output.   
Forced connection drops are extremely difficult to detect as they may be attributed to the very nature of the 
network at that particular instance of time and environmental conditions. Nodes would have to be monitored over 
long periods of time to identify regular occurrences of suspicious disconnections. Overly troublesome nodes need to 
be kicked out of the network in order to prevent the productivity of the cluster from degrading. 
2.6. Additional security requirements for cluster monitors 
Ideally, any node in a wireless ad hoc cluster should be able to become a cluster monitor in order to rotate 
responsibilities in an attempt to manage battery life of cluster nodes. A cluster monitor has several additional 
responsibilities and access privileges. Its primary responsibility is to appropriately split a job received from the 
cluster master node into tasks and delegate them to other nodes within the cluster monitor’s boundary [5]. It receives 
and collates the outputs received from the nodes and then sends back the final output to the master node. The cluster 
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monitor synchronizes the responses from all nodes which have been assigned jobs. Thus a cluster monitor should be 
sufficiently well protected from security intrusions. 
Since any node can become a cluster monitor, a malicious node in the cluster network may eventually become a 
cluster monitor. The cluster monitor maintains the resource description table for its neighboring nodes. 
Unauthorized incorrect modification of the table would affect the processing and assignment of jobs to nodes. A 
priority queue is maintained at cluster monitors which specify the order of assignment of jobs to other nodes. This 
queue is vulnerable to buffer overflow which would cause incoming jobs to be dropped and thus ensue chaos. A 
malicious cluster monitor could modify or completely change the incoming job specification, thus producing 
unexpected results. The threat agent utilizes its newfound abilities as a cluster monitor to assign junk jobs to nodes 
under it and cause unwanted consumption of system resources. This can be done easily by scripting programs that 
cause new processes to fork in an unbounded fashion. These random junk jobs would eventually overload nodes and 
render them as resource exhausted. Furthermore, as ad hoc cluster nodes are working under limited power supply, 
the overloading requests would pose a significant drain on the battery life of the nodes. 
To ensure the protection of cluster monitors, selection of cluster monitors would have to be from a restricted pool 
of trusted devices. The hardware requirements for cluster monitor nodes would have to meet a certain benchmark. 
Since, it is infeasible to run commercial PC security software suites on mobile devices, pro-active approaches to 
threat detection such as anti-virus, anti-malware and firewalls cannot be used to great effect [1]. So, a hardware 
layer of security may be introduced to enforce required characteristics of speed, battery consumption and security.  
2.7. Falsification of resource description table 
A wireless ad hoc high performance cluster takes a regional view of cluster nodes and assigns certain cluster 
monitors that act as centers for job assignments and communication for other nodes in the cluster. The cluster 
monitor is responsible for assigning jobs to each neighboring node based on calculated guesstimates. The cluster 
monitors individually maintain a cache that stores the resource states of its neighboring nodes to which jobs can be 
assigned. Each node is assigned a state corresponding to supra positive, positive, normal and negative states [5, 13]. 
The order of the states implies a decreasing availability of computational resources whereby a supra-positive node 
has abundant free resources, a positive node has adequate free resources for most tasks, a neutral node is a node 
outside the purview of a cluster monitor and a negative node has no free resources to contribute to the cluster at that 
instance of time due to already queued up jobs waiting to be executed at the node. 
This cache at the cluster monitor, also termed as a resource description table, is a prime target for attack. If an 
attacker manages to get access to a cluster monitor, he would be able to manipulate the resource description table. 
The key concept introduced to reduce the drain on the battery life of nodes is the prediction of usage of cluster 
resources according to probabilistic calculations in order to estimate the current load and availability of free 
resources at a cluster node. An abstract resource description table with a falsified record is shown in Table 1. This 
reduces the need for frequent message exchanges of state information, thus conserving battery life. However, any 
malicious modification of the resource description table would corrupt all the calculations and would lead to node 
failures, delayed job execution and other faults due to job assignments that may be beyond the capability of the node 
to handle. Usually cluster nodes utilize idle resources available while user interaction and local tasks and processes 
are being executed at a node. Improper job allocation may cause interference with the local activity performed by a 
user at a node and thus cause the user to withdraw the node from the cluster. 
Table 1. Falsified resource description table at a cluster monitor 
Node id State Available Resource Capacity 
2 Supra-Positive 2 GFLOPS, 700 MB 
4 Positive 107 MIPS, 450 MB 
7 Negative NIL 
5 Supra-Positive 102 MIPS, 200 MB False record 
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2.8. Duplicate services running on a node 
A node may temporarily disconnect from the cluster network unintentionally due to the unstable nature of ad hoc 
networks. However, if the node stays disconnected for too long, then the node is assumed to have failed, when in 
fact it is only a network issue. If the node happens to reconnect to the cluster after that, the cluster master node 
would attempt to restart the cluster application on the node that is part of the single system image abstraction layer. 
However, it is entirely possible that the previous instance of the cluster application is already running at the node 
because the node didn’t actually crash or fail. This leads to multiple copies of the application service running on the 
same node. Having multiple application services running at the same time would create clashes between them that 
could cause improper operations to be performed at the node. As a result, a mechanism for ensuring only one 
instance of the cluster application is running at a node at any instance of time should be ensured. Previous instances 
of the application at the node should time out and shut down gracefully in the case of disconnection from the cluster 
over a predefined amount of time. 
2.9. Sybil attack 
A single node impersonating many non-existent nodes seeks to create an illusion of surplus resources in ad hoc 
high performance wireless clusters. Without proper authentication, cluster monitors may assign tasks to these 
imaginary nodes, which are added to the job assignment priority queues, with complete trust. As these nodes are not 
capable of processing those requests, job processing would be considerably delayed accounting for job reallocations 
and in fact no task handling may occur at all. Furthermore, the fact that when we add more number of nodes in the 
cluster the performance of the cluster increases only up to a particular threshold, thereafter the performance gain 
decreases because the overheads of message passing, state information exchange and monitoring are greater than the 
perceived performance gain from adding more cluster nodes. 
This attack may be prevented with proper cluster level authentication mechanisms as described previously in 
order to ascertain trusted nodes. Thus the non-existent nodes are ignored and not considered a part of the cluster. 
Strict checking for separate network addresses and an analysis of aggregated computing power of the suspicious 
nodes [14] could be performed to identify multiple identities of a single node. 
2.10. Flooding (denial of service) 
Any network must be prepared for denial of service attacks carried out against it. Wireless clusters are vulnerable 
to packet flooding due to the lack of firewall devices to filter traffic. Since all cluster nodes have their own operating 
systems and system tools such as editors and compilers, packet flooding can be initiated from any or all nodes. The 
ad hoc flooding attack exploits dynamic route discovery by broadcasting to request for routing destinations that are 
not present in the network [15]. The packet receive queues of nodes will get filled up with garbage packets with 
incorrect destinations, leading to loss or rejection of genuine packets at the queues. The vastly increased traffic 
between nodes also reduces the available bandwidth for the exchange of messages in the network. Trust of nodes 
must be established for a node to be a part of the ad hoc high performance cluster. 
2.11. Trust establishment - encryption and digital signatures 
The establishment of trust is of paramount importance. The lack of physical infrastructure and vulnerabilities 
associated with wireless ad hoc networks makes providing strong security measures a difficult challenge. Malicious 
cluster nodes can perform many actions to disable a cluster. It may eavesdrop messages sent through it or fabricate 
false data. A means of establishing trust should be in place such that it does not use cluster resources drastically and 
still provide adequate protection. 
Encryption is a very strong mechanism for providing the required trust between communicating nodes. Both link 
to link encryption and end to end encryption schemes may be incorporated to provide the desired level of security. 
Link to link encryption ensures that job inputs and outputs are transferred over a secure channel that would deter 
attempts of wiretapping and eavesdropping. End to end encryption ensures that intermediate routing nodes do not 
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manipulate packet data such as to produce incorrect job outputs. Being a distributed system, application layer 
encryption could involve the use of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for key management. It would also facilitate the 
use of dual signatures for verifying jobs to be executed. The master node and the cluster monitor would partake in 
dual signature verification for the processing of a job at a node, verifying authorization for performing the job. This 
would enhance trust by confirming jobs being executed on the cluster are genuine jobs and not jobs stealing 
processor cycles illegally for purposes such as bitcoin mining. Wireless sensor networks have developed efficient 
mechanisms for key management and secure communication that could be utilized for the purposes of the wireless 
cluster as well. A certificate-less key management system is proposed by [16] that minimizes the spread of a 
security compromise in a particular link. 
3. A proposal for building trusted wireless cluster networks 
The wide array of threats that may affect wireless ad hoc clusters negate the possibility of having a singular 
mechanism to implement the required security. Instead, several security policies may be enforced to achieve the 
desired effect. A policy proposal to provide incremental increase in access permissions based on the current trust 
rating of cluster nodes is suggested to prevent security vulnerabilities.  
Nodes entering a cluster may be registered in one of two possible ways: self-registration of nodes or 
administrative registration [17]. An implicit inference is that nodes registering in the latter manner can be considered 
more trustworthy than nodes registering using the former method at the instance of time under consideration. A 
global trust table consisting of quantitative trust parameters, representing the degree of trust when aggregated, for 
each node in the cluster is maintained. Initial values for certain parameters are set for joining nodes, considering a 
scheme where nodes registered in the administrative way have higher initial values than those of the self-registered 
nodes. A parameter among several others in the table may be the ratio of number of tasks assigned to number of 
tasks completed as shown in Equation 1.  
ܰ݋݀݁ ܶݎݑݏݐ ܲܽݎܽ݉݁ݐ݁ݎ ሺ ௞ܰሻ ൌ
ܰݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݐܽݏ݇ݏ ݏݑܿܿ݁ݏݏ݂ݑ݈݈ݕ ܿ݋݉݌݈݁ݐ݁݀ ሺ݊ሻ
ܶ݋ݐ݈ܽ ݊ݑܾ݉݁ݎ ݋݂ ݐܽݏ݇ݏ ܽݏݏ݅݃݊݁݀ ሺܶሻ                ሺ1ሻ 
Nodes having the maximum permissible value of 1 will be comparatively more trustworthy than other selfish 
nodes with lower (approaching 0) parameter values. The parameters are updated at regular intervals by mining 
collected job statistics for individual nodes and the aggregated values over several intervals consolidates the trust 
rating of cluster nodes. Based on these values, the nodes may be categorized as trusted, partially trusted or untrusted. 
Untrusted nodes are the most probable offenders and suitable action may be taken to remove them. Trusted nodes 
may be assigned higher access rights (for e.g. to participate in the election of cluster monitors) and priorities (for e.g. 
critical task assignment involving critical data) as required. Thus, the higher the trust rating, the more the privileges 
that may be allotted.  
 
Fig. 2. General architecture for building trusted wireless ad hoc cluster networks 
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A group of trusted compute nodes would lead to the formation of a trust platform, which would ensure better 
security, reliability and overall performance. The cluster should be proactive in selecting legitimate compute nodes 
to be part of the cluster and weeding out the malicious nodes. A general architecture for building trusted wireless 
cluster networks is depicted in Fig 2. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper attempts to cover specific security threats that have serious consequences to the performance and 
functioning of a wireless ad hoc high performance cluster and specifies some counter measures that must be in place 
to negate them. Nonetheless, there is no integrated mechanism to prevent all attacks. Specific protection measures 
have to be taken against different attacks. All attacks and its ramifications to wireless clusters mentioned spread 
awareness of providing adequate security for wireless ad hoc high performance clusters. This is indeed one of the 
main purposes of this paper. Wireless computation clusters and grids is a branch that is getting more concentration 
in the recent few years as the processing capability of mobile nodes increase exponentially and communication 
technologies advance. Conventional security mechanisms cannot be applied directly and must be suitably extended 
or scratched out in favor of other methods to ensure requisite security requirements are met. A policy for 
establishing a trusted wireless cluster compute network is proposed for establishing a baseline trust of nodes in the 
cluster. Employing such a strategy is a big step forward in reducing probable security vulnerabilities. 
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